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Abstract. In this study, it was aimed to determine whether there is a bidirectional 
relationship between the ownership and capital structures through the variables representing 
the ownership and capital structures of 142 businesses, which are included in the Service 
and Industrial Indexes of Borsa Istanbul (BIST) between the years of 2006-2014. The 
capital structure in the research is represented by the leverage ratio (TBTV), which 
determines the extent to which a business is dependent on debt and to determine how much 
of the assets owned by the business are financed with debt, while the ownership structure is 
represented by the largest shareholder’s equity (EBOP), the foreign share (YAP), the 
corporate investor ratio (KURY) and the number of the shareholders with more than 10% 
share of the business (ORTAK). The factors influencing the bi-directional causality 
between the ownership and the capital structures were researched with the Panel Vector 
Autoregressive Model (VAR). In the scope of the VAR analysis, Granger causality test and 
the impulse response analyzes were also performed. It was found in the result of the 
analysis that in the model where the capital structure (TBTV) is a dependent variable in the 
service index, none of the independent variables belonging to the ownership structure has a 
causality relation through the TBTV. In the model where the variables belonging to the 
ownership structure were dependent variables, it was found that the independent variable 
belonging to the capital structure (TBTV) is the reason of the change in the ownership 
variables of EBOP, HAO and KURY variables. According to the results obtained, 1 period 
delay in the capital structure causes decrease in EBOP and HAO; increase in KURY. As to 
the businesses in the industrial index, a causality relationship was not seen between the 
ownership structures and the capital structures in the context of these variables and the two 
structures do not effect each other. 
Keywords. Ownership structure, Capital structure, Granger casuality, BIST.  
JEL. C33,G10, G32. 
 
1. Introduction 
n this article, the casual relationship between the ownership and capital 
structure indicators belonging to the industrial index and service index 
businesses in the BİST was tested using the Granger causality test and the 
relationship between the ownership and the capital structures was examined. The 
conflicts of interest between business owners, managers and the other stakeholders 
and the conflicts of interest between the control holders of the business and the 
stakeholders, who follow from the outside, constitute the center of corporate 
governance literature. The similarities can be observed in corporate ownership and 
the capitalstructures in the enterprises as well as serious differences. These 
differences can affect the financial performance of the business as well as these 
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impacts arising from these differences affect both the formation decisions of the 
ownership and capital structures. The existing capital structure of a business refers 
to the association of the debt and stockholders’ equity used in the financing 
requirement of the business. The construction of the capital structure of the 
business and the formation of a structure according to this is one of the most 
important financial issues for which a business is obliged to make a decision.  
These decisions have an undeniable importance on the financial structure, 
ownership structure of the business and the profitability, which is one of the main 
reasons for the establishment of the business. The founding partners, shareholders 
and managers responsible for the financing of the business are trying to create a 
capital composition that will increase the value of the business or increase the 
satisfaction of the business partners.  
Until 1958, the management directors have focused on the capital composition 
that was unaltered for any situation and had the aim of reaching the most 
appropriate capital structure.  However, a s, carried out by Modigliani and Miller 
(M&M) has revealed that there is no correlation between the capital composition 
and capital cost, in other words, business value and the business risk is more 
remarkable in this respect. In other words, it can be said that the first model of 
business finance theory in the modern sense began with the study of M&M’s study 
on the capital composition. Also, numerous studies have been carried out on the 
variables that affect the construction of the capital structures of the companies in 
the period following the M&M model, which is revealed in the modern sense. 
Very different results were obtained according to the factors used in the studies 
aiming to show what the capital structure is. In these studies, briefly the subject of 
the theory of the trade-off tax, the subject of the finance hierarchy information 
asymmetry, the effective markets for M&M model and finally the importance of 
the representative costs as representative theory are mentioned.  
The concept of the ownership means to have the right to be able to make 
savings and to transact related to the existing entity due to having right of usage of 
this entity.  The notion of the ownership concentration refers to the control of a 
large amount of the existing shares belonging to the business by a certain person or 
persons. In parallel with the gradually growing business structures, the increase of 
the shareholders has led to some changes in the existing ownership structures of the 
businesses and this change also continues today.  
 
2. Theory and literature 
2.1. The ownership structure 
The opinion of expanding of the capital owners to a wide basis in the 
businesses, (in other words having a low intensity partnership structure) and the 
business is being controlled by the managers has been possessed in the corporate 
financing for a long time. The starting point for this view by many authors is 
Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means’ “Modern Institutions and Private Property”, 
1933. Berle & Means (1933) noted in this book that the businesses in USA that 
have a capital structure spread on wide basis are prevalent and remarked that the 
ownership of the capital is scattered among the small shareholders and also the 
control is concentrated in the hands of the top managers.  Therefore, it is thought 
that this work caused the formation of a literature in a supervisory framework (La 
Porta, et. al., 1999; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). After this work, a conflict of the 
interest between the managers and the shareholders is being intensively studied by 
researchers who try to understand the nature of the companies (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Jensen & Meckling (1976).  It has been argued that 
the low-level shareholder managers cannot maximize the shareholder wealth, and 
this is because these managers have the tendency to use additional funds.    
Nevertheless, Demsezt & Lehn (1985) argues that the shareholders have both 
advantages and disadvantages from their intensity is the ownership structure. 
According to the authors, the benefits that the owners have in reducing the share of 
the ownership form a disadvantage for a greater intensity. According to this, the 
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owners can direct their energy and their time to the works that the benefits of these 
works remain completely for themselves. The cost of avoiding from ownership will 
most likely to be lower company performance and the result of this also be shared 
by all the shareholders at the rate of their ownership.  
However, the managerial point of view started to be questioned in the later 
empirical studies and it is revealed that the ownership is distributed at more 
reasonable (in a not low intensity) levels in publicly owned businesses both in the 
examples from USA and other developed and underdeveloped countries. La Porta, 
et. al., (1999) in their studies, summarized the studies that provided the evidences 
of increased management ownership at the end of 90’s. The authors found in their 
samples that the 36% of the large companies are in the low-intensity and 30% of 
them are controlled by the family or individuals, 18% of them are controlled by the 
government, 5% of them are controlled by a low intensity financial institution and 
5% of them are controlled by a low intensity business. For smaller businesses, the 
percentage of the companies controlled by the family rose to 53%. According to 
the authors, these studies show that large companies in many countries have large 
shareholders and that these shareholders also take an active role in corporate 
governance (La Porta et. al., 1999) 
La Porta et. al., (1999) divide the corporate ownership into two as widely held 
companies and the companies with ultimate owners. However, the authors use the 
groups as family or individual for important owners, Government, the financial 
institutions with low intensity partnership (ownership) structure (like bank or 
insurance companies), the business with low intensity partnership structure and 
Other (the cooperative that the control is not on single investor, “voting trust” 
agreements, etc.). Margaritis & Psillaki (2010) divided the important shareholders 
into three groups as the family or the family related members, financial institutions 
and the companies with other ownership structure.  
 
2.2.Capital structure 
Capital is one of the most essential and basic characteristic requirements for 
businesses to continue their assets and activities. The businesses meet their capital 
needs by applying to variety of sources or by supplying them from their own 
internal structures. A business provides its funds, which are required to continue to 
its operations, mainly from two resources as equity or foreign resource.  It refers to 
the credit or debt relationship expressed in foreign resources. The expression of 
equity refers to the ownership, namely ownership relation. The capital structure, as 
mentioned above, is the result of the combination of the long term foreign 
resources and the equity resources used to provide the financing of the business. 
The financing structure of the business includes all the items on the passive side of 
the balance sheet. There is a difference between the capital structure and the 
financing structure. The short-term debts and their responses belonging to the 
business take place in the financing structure. However, these items do not take 
place in the capital structure of the business. The financing structure refers to the 
passive side of the balance sheet and reveals the way of financing. As for the 
capital structure, it refers to the formation of long-term financing resources (Türko, 
2002). 
The resources that the business supplies from outside its internal structure, 
namely the debts an be categorized in three ways as short, medium and long 
according to their duration. The debts reflect the obligations of the company and 
the concession money that the business has taken to repay under certain conditions 
and in a certain term (Türko, 2002). These foreign resources can be seen as directly 
borrowed, the credits drawn from the bank, the bonds that can be subsequently 
converted into stocks, the bonds connected to the property etc. (Koller, Goedhart & 
Wessels, 2005). 
The equity is defined as the resources that are not tied to any fixed terms, used 
in the financing of the activities and put into business by the shareholders with the 
anticipation of return in the certain periods (Babuşçu & Hazar, 2008). The equity 
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financing can also be provided by the business in itself through funds, 
undistributed profits and provisions as well as from outside the company through 
stock issue. Providing in this way, the costs of the funds to the business, the 
possible effects to the business risk and the market value should also be taken into 
consideration (Korkmaz, Başaran & Gökbulut, 2009). 
The capital structure is a concept closely related to the business’ cost of the 
capital and it is a combination of long-term resources that the business uses in its 
operations. The main purpose of the capital structure decisions is to maximize the 
value of the business on the market by bringing long-term funding sources together 
and providing an appropriate combination of these sources (Berk, 2007). 
The businesses can also benefit from the leverage effect of using the foreign 
resources of financing by using the tax advantages with the recognition of the 
interest payments as expense, which belongs to the foreign resources that they have 
used instead of using the equity. However, this method will benefit the businesses 
up to a certain level and after a certain period of time, some difficulties can be 
created in their later on activities. This method is defined as the traditional 
approach in the literature and it states that there is an optimal capital composition 
for the businesses.  When the businesses reach the optimum composition, they will 
be able to maximize their value by pulling the capital costs to a minimum level 
(Schwartz, 1959). 
Many factors influence the decision of the financial manager in the business to 
make the most appropriate determination of the capital structure. The main reason 
for this is the fact that the situation of each business is different from each other 
and also the economic situation of the country that the company is located in, 
industry and the company characteristics and the financial manager’s tendencies 
about the risk affect the decisions related to the capital decisions (Akgüç, 1998). 
 
2.3.The relations between the ownership structure and the capital 
structure 
There are many useful theories instead of a single theory in terms of debt-equity 
selection. According to the trade-off theory, the companies try to find the balance 
level between the tax advantage gained by loan and the costs of the financial 
possible dangers. For this reason, the Equilibrium Theorem predicts that the 
companies that pay the taxes are reasonably indebted. The Pecking Order Theory 
states that the businesses will become indebted rather than issuance of securities 
when internal business resources are not sufficient for the asset financing. 
According to the theory, the total amount of the reflects the need for the foreign 
resources (Myers & Majluf, 1984). As to Jensen’s Free Cash Flow Theory, the 
conflicts of interest about the payment policies between the shareholders and the 
managers are severe, especially when they create significant free cash flow in the 
business. According to Jensen (1986) The main problem is to motivate the 
managers to consume money instead of wasting it as it is not corporately active or 
the managers directing to a investment that brings income below the cash capital 
cost in their hands. For this reason, the high debt ratios can be used as a 
disciplinary tool to reduce cash flow expenditure generating from the management, 
such as the liquidity risk (Jensen, 1986). However, when the cash flow form a 
business’ activities is greater than the profitable investment opportunities, the high 
debt levels will increase company value, despite the risk of financial difficulty. 
This theory is suitable for the companies that tend to over-investment. In summary 
the equilibrium theory emphasizes the taxes, the hierarchy theory emphasizes the 
information differences (asymmetry) and the free cash flow theory emphasizes the 
agency costs (Myers, 2001).  
Apart from these, Zwiebel’s Theory of the Administrative Consolidation reveals 
that it is a negative situation for the shareholders to increase managers’ share of 
capital in the business. According to the theory, the managers can spend 
unnecessarily and go on the road of excessive borrowing (due to the possibility of 
hostile takeover) (Zwiebel, 1996). As to the Representation Theory, the increase in 
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the ratio of the foreign resources within the total resources increases the efficiency 
of the managers and reduces the problem of the representation over the equity. This 
means that on the contrary to the Modigliani & Miller Theory, it shows that the 
business value is not independent of the cost of the capital (due to the cost of the 
representation) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The relations between the ownership 
and the capital structures have been examined less relatively to the wide literature 
between the ownership and the company performance. These studies make 
predictions intended to managerial avoidance from the risk, monitoring and 
bankruptcy costs, the threats intended to take over the company and high or low 
borrowing (financial leverage) in the active financing, according to the growth 
opportunities of the companies. The theories of ownership and capital structures 
emphasize the role of the debt in reducing the problem of proxy between the 
managers and the capital structures (King & Santor, 2008) Jensen & Meckling 
(1976) argued that the managers prefer low borrowing because it reduces the 
bankruptcy risk and also Jensen (1986) argued that the shareholders high leverage, 
especially in the companies with excess free cash flow, because it reduces over 
investment problem.  
In addition to the studies on the ownership and the capital structures is the US 
companies, Brailsford et. al., (2002) has reviewed the Australian companies, Short, 
et. al., (2002) reviewed the United Kingdom companies and King & Santor 
reviewed the Canadian companies. Brailsford et. al., (2002) has found evidence 
about the non-linear relation between the management ownership level and the 
leverage; and the linear and positive relation between the outside the business 
block shareholders and the leverage. As the proxy conflict arises more debt usage 
need in the low-level management ownership, the managers in the high level 
management ownership try to reduce their risks to have low borrowing. Anderson 
& Reeb (2003) has found a significant result that internal business ownership by 
the managers or the family has no effect on the level of the borrowing. 
There are not many theories correlating with the control strengthening 
mechanisms (binary stock and Pyramid Structure) and the capital structures. In 
case of binary shares, the organizations, which give the credit, can monitor the 
control holding shareholders and can put limitations to the contracts. It is expected 
that the companies with binary stocks will use the lower leverage than those with 
other low intensity ownership structures (King & Santor, 2008). Bianco & 
Nicodano (2006) estimated that the owners in the pyramid structure businesses will 
prefer to enter the loan market and therefore they have to have higher leverage than 
the single-handed companies.  
 
2.4.The relations between the ownership structure and the capital 
structure 
As stated earlier, there are various aspects of relations between the capital 
structure and the ownership structures of the businesses. In these studies, 
examining the relationships between the capital structure and the various forms of 
the ownership (outside the business block shareholders, management ownership, 
internal business ownership, control strengthening mechanisms), the effects of the 
externally taken ownership and on the capital composition were investigated 
(Jensen, 1986; Brailsford, Oliver & Pua, 2002; King & Santor, 2008). Brailsford, 
Oliver & Pua (2002) found a nonlinear relationship between the management 
ownership and the leverage. According to this, the proxy conflict in the businesses 
with low management ownership is reduced and this leads to a higher level of 
borrowing. However, where the managers have a significant share of the business’ 
ownership, the managerial ownership leads to the managerial opportunities and 
lower debt usage (Margaritis & Psilakis, 2010). In addition to this, Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001) argued in the empirical studies that it is a low possibility that the 
professional managers of the businesses are one of the top five shareholders of the 
business. the 223 companies that were in the samples of the authors, only 138 % of 
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the companies had a portion of the shares as a management group, while 192 
companies have a share of the management at 10%. 
One of the problems in the studies that examine the capital and the ownership 
structures is the causality. In the studies on these two structures, as mentioned 
above, the effects of the various ownership structures especially on the capital 
structure or borrowing decisions have been examined. In addition to this, there also 
studies in which the ownership is used as endogenous (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985; La Porta, et. al., 1999; Jensen, Solberg & Zorn, 1992). Demsetz & 
Villalonga (2001) give two examples that show that the company performance 
influences the ownership structure. According to the authors, leverage purchase of 
non-managerial shares is an extreme example of changing the ownership structure 
of the anticipated company performances. The benefits provided by the governance 
in the form of option contracts on stocks are also the examples of this causality 
(Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).  
Along with the company performance, the leverage and various other debt 
ratios, such as industry-specific rates and the sector puppets can also be the 
determinants of the ownership structure. The leverage, which is an important 
management mechanism, can also influence the choice of the other management 
mechanism at the same time (Litov, 2005). However, the effects on the ownership 
structure of the capital structure indicators as leverage are usually researched 
indirectly. 
There are various studies on the effect of the decisions about the capital 
structure on internal ownership. Stulz (1988) argues that the high level of leverage 
enables the managers to control more voting rights according to their shares and 
thus the debt ratio deviating from a certain value leads to a decrease in the share of 
the managers. In addition to this, the shares of the company become more risky due 
to the increase in debt. It is possible that the managers will have to avoid risk when 
the company’s debt increases and have lower share combinations due to their 
limited wealth. However, there is a possibility of losing his/her job in case of the 
bankruptcy of the company by not fulfilling the various obligations based on 
foreign resource usage, and this causes a decrease in the steps to consolidate the 
stock (Pindado, & de la There, 2008).   
Denis & Sarin (1999) has reviewed the ownership and the board structure 
during 1983-1992. The authors tested whether there is a relationship between the 
ownership and the management board structures and the changes in the company 
specific and owner specific determinants of these structures and the previous 
company performance and the external corporate control threats. Among them, the 
debt ratio from the company-specific rates (ratio of the total of total debts assets) 
and the negative relation between the ownership and the ownership of the board 
have been obtained. Accordingly, one-unit increase in the debt ratio leads to a 
6.65% decrease in the internal company and board ownership ratio. The authors did 
not find a significant relationship between the debt ratio and the ownership of the 
independent board members. 
Jensen, Solberg & Zorn (1992) have examined the relationship between the 
internal ownership and the debt policies. The authors analyzed horizontal cross-
sectional observations of the companies in 1982 and 1987 with a system 
equilibrium containing separate equations for the ownership, debt and dividend 
policies. The t values for both years were -0.99 and 1.32, respectively, as the 
dependent variable for internal ownership, so the authors could not obtain any 
meaningful evidence that the financial policies are an important determinant of the 
internal ownership. In other words, after for business-specific characteristics size, 
operational risk, share of the research and development expenditures in the total 
assets etc) that affect the internal ownership, the borrowing or the capital structure 
(also the dividend policy at the same time) does not give an idea about the level of 
the internal ownership of the company. 
Holderness, Krozner & Sheehan (1999) showed that the proportion of the 
managers ownership’s weighted average to the company sizes listed in the New 
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York stock exchange increased to 21% in 1995, which was 13% in 1935. The 
authors investigated the effect of the debt ratio, which is company-specific 
characteristics as the determinant of the manager ownership such as company size, 
volatility, company age, to the manager ownership. According to this, it was 
determined that the ratio of the long-term debt to the total value of the company 
(stock + debt) changed from 0.42-0.43 in 1935 to 0.98-1.00 in 1995. For both 
years, the sign debt ratio is negative and there is evidence that the manager 
ownership in the businesses with high debt usage is lower and it is even lower 
today than in the past. 
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001) examined the effects of the various ownership, 
accounting and stock price data on the ownership of 223 companies from all the 
sectors in the US economy between 1976-1980. In the study, in which two 
different ownership structures were taken endogenously as the management 
ownership and the ownership of the top five shareholders, the evidence has been 
obtained that the borrowing level received as a variant had a negative effect on 
both types of ownership. According to this, both ownership level decreases while 
the ratio of the debts (the foreign resources) to the total asset carrying amount 
increases. This rate indicates the possibility of the creditors (or otherwise the 
shareholders) being able to monitor the management. For this reason, the high debt 
ratio should lead to the fact that the five major shareholders have lower shares. 
  According to the authors, if the credit providers contribute to the control of the 
business (monitoring), this can cause these companies assets to abandon from the 
movements to strengthen their assets more with the share ownership of the 
management at the same time. The statistically significant negative relationships 
determined between the leverage and the ownership also confirm this theoretical 
basis empirically. 
Pindado & de la Torre (2008) investigated how the debts, dividends and the 
investment decisions effect the external and internal ownership intensity level and 
whether this effect differs between the companies controlled and not controlled by 
the family. For this, the authors have defined two models describing the ownership 
intensity and the internal ownership and extended these models to Spanish 
companies that are controlled and not controlled by the families. The authors 
reached the conclusion that the companies controlled by the families, the external 
owners and the managers decreased their share combinations due to the risk 
evasion. This result, which shows the negative effect of the debt on ownership 
intensity, was also seen in the external owners, being even stronger at the managers 
of the companies controlled by the families. The coefficient of debt ratio in family-
controlled companies is -0.0539 while the companies not controlled by the family 
this ratio is estimated as -0.1048. The authors interpreted this result as the families 
are more concerned with maintaining their control over the company and they are 
less concerned with the financial risk. As to the model where the internal 
ownership is the dependent variable, it has been estimated that the coefficient of 
the debt ratio at the companies controlled by the families is -0.1281 and -0.0162 in 
the companies not controlled by the families. According to the authors, the results 
are explained by the fact that the managers of the family controlled companies are 
avoiding more risks. 
The studies showing the effect of the capital structure variables on the 
ownership structures are summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 1.The Effect of the Capital Structure on the Ownership Structure 
The Effect of the Leverage on the Ownership 
Intensity 
The Effect of the Leverage to the Internal 
Business Ownership 
Demsetz & Villalonga (2001)   
Pindado & de la Torre (2008) 
Jensen (1986)  
Stulz (1988)  
Denis & Sarin (1999) 
Holderness, Krozner & Sheehan (1999) 
Pindado & de la Torre (2008) 
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3. Methodology 
3.1. The purpose of the research 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the relations between the 
ownership and the capital structures of 142 businesses operating in the BİST and 
having continuity in the related period bidirectionally with the Granger causality 
test.  In the related study, it will be attempted to explain with an empirical model 
whether there is a bidirectional relationship between the free float rate, the foreign 
share, corporate investor existence, the number of the partners, the data belonging 
to the biggest partner and the leverage ratio variable representing the capital 
structure of the company.  
 
3.2. Granger causality test 
Granger causality is a statistically test of hypothesis of the usefulness condition 
of a set of generated time series to estimate again another time series (Granger, 
1969). The generated X time series, some t tests on X’s deferred values and Y’s 
deferred values and the possible future values of X values the formation of the Y 
with F tests put a meaningful information statistically, it is the Granger reason of 
the time series belonging to Y. 
The model created to measure the Granger causality does not represent an 
economic model in a structural style. The relevant model aims to carry out 
causality tests, not the predictions of the future situation. Therefore, the variables 
belonging to the model must first be subjected to an elimination or go for 
stabilization (Granger, 1988). 
The general VAR model consisting of two variables is as follows; 
 
Xt = A(L)Xt + B(L)Yt+u1t 
Yt=C(L)Xt+D(L)Yt+u2t 
 
In this equation A, B, C and D express the parameters and L shows the delay 
processor. For stability, the characteristic equation’s roots belonging to the 
parameter matrix should be outside the (-1 and +1) ranges. u1t and u2t, which express 
the regression residuals, are considered to have both independent and zero average 
variance.  
After the appropriate delay structure belonging to number 1 model is 
determined in the model selection terms, then the model parameters are predicted 
by the smallest squares method. Testing an empty hypothesis as “Y is not the 
Granger reason of the X” requires a test to be done about the parameters belonging 
to Y are zero together in an equation where X takes place as a dependent variable. 
Tests like F, Likelihood ratio and Wald tests can be used as application to perform 
the test.  According to the performed F test, in case that the hypothesis defined as 
empty is not accepted, an interpretation as the B(L) parameters are different from 
zero statistically will come out.  
 
3.3. Data set and sampling 
In this study, a total of 205 companies trading their shares in BİST with the 
indexes of XUSIN (Industrial Index) and XUHIZ (Service Index) are operating. 
However, the data of 63 businesses were excluded from the analysis because they 
were not continuous in the examination period.In this sense, there are 142 
businesses’ 9 years of data belonging to the 2006-2014 period takes place in the 
analyzes. During the analysis, it was determined that the series were not stationary 
due to the unit root problem. In order to ensure the stability of the series, the 
differences from the first and second degrees and square root and logarithmic 
transformations were made. The financial data belonging to the companies 
examined within the analysis were obtained in two different ways. The financial 
data for the 2008 and the early periods of the businesses included in both indexes 
were collected from the official internet page of the BİST. As to the all the data 
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regarding to 2009 and later were collected from BİST, KAP and MKK internet 
pages and the public information published in the official web sites related to the 
businesses with the Finnet Stock Expert and Analysis Expert programs. 
In the study, primarily dependent, independent and control variables were 
selected. In the determination of the variables, it has been started from the variables 
that reached the most consensus on the literature. Variables used are classified 
under 3 titles as the capital structure, the ownership structure and the control 
variables. 
The variables used in the research and their calculations are presented in detail in 
the following tables. 
 
Table 2.Ownership structure variables 
 Variable Names Symbol Variable Calculations 
Ownership  
Structure 
Share of the Biggest Partner EBOP 
Capital Amount of the Biggest 
Partner / Total Equities  
Public Rate HAO 
Public Capital Amount / Total 
Equities 
Number of Partners PARTNER Number of partners with more than 
10% share ratio 
Foreign Share YAP 
Foreign Capital Amount / Total 
Equities 
Corporate Investor Ratio KURY 
Corporate Investors Percentage in the 
Total Capital of the Business 
Note: Table 2 contains the independent variables of the ownership structure used in the analysis and 
their calculations. 
 
Table 3.Capital structure variables 
 Variable Name Symbol Variable Calculations 
Capital Structure Leverage Ratio TBTV Total Debt / Total Assets 
 
Two main hypotheses have been developed to be tested in the analyzes. From 
this point of view, the bidirectional relationship between the ownership and the 
capital structure is tested in line with these main hypotheses. 
The hypotheses tested in the analyzes are established as follows. 
H1: The ownership structure affects the capital structure of the business. 
Supporting Hypotheses: 
H1a: The share of the largest shareholder in the business affects the capital structure of 
the business. 
H1b: The free float ratio of the business affects the capital structure of the business. 
H1c: The corporate investor ratio of the business affects the capital structure of the 
business. 
H1d: The number of the partners of the business affects the capital structure of the 
business. 
H1e: The foreign share of the business affects the capital structure of the business. 
H2: The capital structure affects the ownership structure of the business. 
Supporting Hypotheses: 
H2a:  The leverage ratio of the business affects the share of the largest shareholder of 
the business. 
H2b: The leverage ratio of the business affects the free float ratio of the business. 
H2c: The leverage ratio of the business affects the corporate investor ratio of the 
business. 
H2d: The leverage ratio of the business affects the number of the partners of the 
business. 
H2e: The leverage ratio of the business affects the foreign share of the business. 
 
Before analyzing whether there is a meaningful relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables given above for the 2006-2014 period, it 
was researched whether there is a cointegrated condition in these variables.  
Time series are the sequences of the observations made at periodic time 
intervals.  One of the most important issues in time series is stability. Almost all 
the statistical conclusions are made under the assumption of series stability. If the 
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series is not stable, the series must be stabilized in any way before proceeding to 
the conclusions (Akdi, 2010). As in the analysis of the whole-time series and the 
panel data analysis, which performs both time and horizontal cross-sectional 
analysis together, the variables should be stable so as not to cause false relations 
between the variables. It is suggested that the stability should be examined in two 
ways. The common unit root process was examined with Levin, Lin & Chu (2002) 
test and each unit was examined with Im, Pesaran, & Shin (2003), ADF-Fisher 
Chi-Square (1979) test. The panel unit root test results are shown in Table 4. The 
unit roots were first examined in the level; when the unit root is detected in the 
level, it is stabilized by taking the first or second differences respectively. 
The statistics obtained as a result of the analysis related to the service sector are 
as in Table 3. The hypotheses for the ADF unit root in the service index are 
established as follows. 
H0 = Series is not stable (there is unit root)  
H1: Series is stable (there is no unit root) 
 
Table 4. The series’ stability (Unit Root) test results 
Series LLC IPS ADF1 
EBOP -0,596 -5,935** 57,842* 
L(D2HAO) -3,600** -2,593** 79,876** 
LKURY -47,587** -6,654** 65,679 
PARTNER -15,144** -5,822** 65,056** 
LYABP -3,05** -0,278 91,129** 
D(TBTV) -35,703** -8,769** 171,632** 
Notes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01;  1:  Asymptotic X2 
 
In table 4, Ho is accepted since all the variables are not stable at level I(0) 
values. Then, when the first (I(1) differences of these variables are taken, as the p 
value is less than 0,05, the stability is obtained and H1 is accepted.      
 It is seen that the best values of the information criteria are obtained in the first 
delay (Table 4). In this case, after ensuring the variables to be stable by taking their 
first delays to determine the appropriate model in the cointegration analysis, the 
maximum delay length should be determined for the series before proceeding to the 
Engle Granger Cointegration analysis. For this purpose, the VAR (vector 
autoregressive) model was used to determine the maximum delay length to identify 
how many years of delay the interaction between the series occurred and the 
Akaike and Schwarz information criteria were practiced. The maximum delay 
lengths determined according to the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria are 
given in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Determination of the appropriate model for cointegration analysis 
Model Akaike Schwarz  
Fixed termless, without trend -2,39(1) -1,08(1) 
Fixed term, with trend  -3,14(1) -1,79(1) 
Linear, fixed term, without trend  -3,13(1) -1,69(1) 
Linear, fixed term, with trend  -3,13(1) -1,64(1) 
Quadratic, fixed term, with trend  -3,14(1) -1,57(1)v 
 
In both information criteria with the cointegration, the model with the first 
delayed second model (fixed term, with trend) cointegration is the model in which 
the zero hypothesis cannot be rejected (Table 5). According to the results of the 
cointegration analysis, the trace statics shows two and the max-eigen statics shows 
1 cointegration vectors were found (Table 6). In other words, it shows that there is 
a long-lasting relationship (they move together long-lasting) between the variables. 
The error correction models are used when there is a long-run relationship between 
the variables. There was a lost of long-lasting information during the stabilization 
of the series by taking the differences. The error models are applied to remove the 
imbalances created by these losses. In the error correction models, the error terms 
of the regression series are formed and a delayed version of the obtained error 
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terms is added to the model. According to the Trace and Max-Eigen statistics, 
Johansen-Juselius cointegration test findings are presented in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Co-Integration Analysis Results 
  Trace Max-Eigen 
Hypotheses Eigenvalue Test statistic Critical value Test statistic Critical value 
N/A* 0,635 263,71** 103,84 133,34** 40,95 
At most 1* 0,438 130,36** 76,97 76,10** 34,80 
At most 2* 0,177 54,27* 54,07 25,73 28,58 
Note: H0: There is no cointegration. The zero hypothesis was rejected at 5%* significance level **1% 
significance level. 
 
In the next step, the VAR (Vector Autoregressive) model was estimated to 
determine the presence and direction of the causality relationship between the 
series. In the econometric studies using the VAR model, no distinction is made 
between the internal and external variables and the variables or sizes are examined 
simultaneously. Moreover, the restrictions that may arise from the economic theory 
are not allowed to distort the model definition of the assumptions. Thus, the model 
allows the correct establishment of the relationship between the variables (Bahar, 
2006: 143). The stability of the estimated model depends on the eigenvalue of the 
coefficient matrix. If all of the eigenvalues of the coefficient matrix are within the 
unit circle, the system is stable or steady and if at least one of the eigenvalues is 
over or outside the unit circle, the system is not stable or shows a gradually 
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Graph 1.VAR Model Stability Graphic 
 
The positions of the inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial in the 
unit circle show that the model is stable (Graph 1).  
Two-way causality has been assessed in order to research the reciprocal effects 
of the ownership structure and the capital structure. VAR Granger causality test 
results are shown in Table 7.  
 
Table 7. Delayed VAR model-Granger causality test results 
The dependent variable: Capital 
Structure (TBTV) 
Granger Causality / 
Block Exteriority Wald 
VAR Prediction 
Basic hypothesis X2 df p ß t p 
EBOP is not the cause of TBTV 0,026 1  0,871 0,122 1,346 0,178 
HAO is not the cause of TBTV 3,430 1  0,064 -0,472 -1,444 0,148 
KURY is not the cause of TBTV 0,167 1  0,682 -0,164 -1,373 0,169 
ORTAK is not the cause of TBTV 0,632 1  0,426 0,011 0,352 0,724 
YABP is not the cause of TBTV 0,291 1  0,589 0,000 0,004 0,996 
Independent variable: TBTV       
TBTV is not the cause of EBOP 15,17 1  0,000 -0,913 -1,971 0,048 
TBTV is not the cause of HAO 4.705 1  0,030 -0,813 -2,173 0,030 
TBTV is not the cause of KURY 5,272 1  0,021 1,721 2,254 0,024 
TBTV is not the cause of ORTAK 3,180 1  0,074 1,356 0,817 0,414 
TBTV is not the cause of YABP 2,732 1  0,098 3,085 0,527 0,598 
Note:  H0: There is no causality relationship from independent variable to the dependent variable. 
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In the model where the capital structure (TBTV) is a dependent variable, the 
finding that none of the independent variables belonging to the ownership structure 
has a causality relation to the TBTV was found. In the model where the variables 
belonging to the ownership structure were dependent variables, the finding that 
independent variable belonging to the capital structure (TBTV) is the reason of the 
change in the ownership structure variables EBOP (X2 = 15, 17; p<0,05), HAO (X2 
= 4,71; p<0,05) and KURY (X2 = 5,27; p<0,05). According to the results obtained, 
1 period delay in the capital structure causes decrease in EBOP and HAO; increase 
in KURY. The response of the ownership structure to a standard failure capital 












1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of EBOP to Cholesky
One S.D. D_TBTV Innovation
 
Graph 2a: The Response of the EBOP to TBTV (Impulse-Response Function) 
 
In return to a standard failure shock in TBTV, EBOP variable first responds 
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Graph 2b: The Response of the HAO to the TBTV (Impulse-Response Function) 
 
In return of a standard failure shock in the TBTV, the HAO variable first 
responds decreasingly and then gives gradually increasing consecutive responses; 
however, this reaction transforms to a gradually decreasing reaction and stabilizes 
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Graph 2c: The Response of the KURY to the TBTV (Impulse-Response Function) 
Note: In return of a standard failure shock in TBTV, the KURY variable first responds decreasingly; 
then it stabilizes (Graph 2c). 
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H1a Rejection: EBOP variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1b Rejection: HAO variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1c Rejection: KURY variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1d Rejection: ORTAK variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1e Rejection: YABP variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1 Rejection: The ownership structure is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H2a Acceptance: The capital structure is the cause of the EBOP variable. The 1 term delay 
in the capital structure causes a decrease in the EBOP variable. 
H2b Acceptance: The HAO variable is the cause of the HAO variable. The 1 term delay in 
the capital structure causes a decrease in the HAO variable. 
H2c Acceptance: The KURY variable is the cause of the KURT variable. The 1 term delay 
in the capital structure causes an increase in the KURY variable. 
H2d Rejection: The ORTAK variable is not the cause of the ORTAK variable. 
H2e Rejection: The EBOP variable is not the cause of the YABP variable. 
The statistics obtained as a result of the analyzes related to the industrial sector 
are as in Table 8. The hypotheses for the ADF unit root in the industrial index are 
established as follows. 
H0 = Series is not stable (there is unit root)  
H1: Series is stable (there is no unit root) 
The results of the stability analysis of the ownership structure and the capital 
structure variables of the companies in the industrial sector are presented in Table 8 
below. 
 
Table 8. The series’ stability (Unit Root) test results 
Series LLC IPS ADF1  
EBOP -1189,73** -7580,91** 247,365** 
LDHAO -45,390** -4,503** 275,045** 
SKURY -27,248** -4,956** 355,621** 
PARTNER -26,047** -6,498** 109,204** 
LYABP -42,158** -10,642** 491,237** 
TBTV -29,693** -7,727** 440,954** 
Notes: *p<0,05; **p<0,01; 1:Asymptotic X2 
 
In Table 8, Ho is accepted since all the variables are not stable at level ı(0) 
values. Then, when the first (I(1) differences of these variables are taken, as the p 
value is less than 0,05, the stability is obtained and H1 is accepted.  First delays of 
the variables will be used to determine the appropriate model in the cointegration 
analysis since the best values of the dependent and independent variables take the 
most appropriate information criteria in the first delays.  
 
Table 9. Determination of the appropriate model for cointegration analysis 
Model Akaike Schwarz  
Fixed termless, without trend -6,045 -5,672 
Fixed term, with trend  -6,559 -6,151 
Linear, fixed term, without trend  -6,555 -6,109 
Linear, fixed term, with trend  -6,549 -6,099 
Quadratic, fixed term, with trend  -6,544 -6,053 
 
In Table 9, the second model (fixed term, with trend) was accepted as the model 
with the cointegration since the zero hypothesis was not rejected in both 
information criteria that have cointegration. Johansen-Juselius cointegration test 
findings according to the Trace and Max-Eigen statistics are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Co-integration analysis results 
  Trace Max-Eigen 
Hypotheses Eigenvalue  Test statistic Critical value Test statistic Critical value 
N/A* 0,133 202,5** 83,9 94,9** 36,6 
At most 1* 0,065 107,8** 60,1 45,0** 30,4 
At most 2* 0,043 62,8** 40,2 29,8** 24,2  
At most 3* 0,041 33,1** 24,3 28,0** 17,8 
Note: H0: There is no cointegration. The zero hypothesis was rejected at 5%* significance level **1% 
significance level. 
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According to the results of the cointegration analysis, the trace and max-eigen 
statistics show that 3 cointegration vectors were found (Table 10). In other words, 
it shows that there is a long-run relationship (they move together long-run) between 
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Graph 3. VAR Model Stability Graphic 
Note: The positions of the inverse roots of the AR characteristic polynomial in the unit circle show 
that the model is stable (Graph 3). 
 
Two-way causality has been assessed in order to research the reciprocal effects 
of the ownership structure and the capital structure. VAR Granger causality test 
results are shown in Table 11.  
 
Table 11. Delayed VAR Model-Granger Causality Test Results 
The dependent variable: Capital 
Structure (TBTV) 
Granger Causality / Block 
Exteriority Wald 
VAR Prediction 
Basic hypothesis X2 df p ß t p 
EBOP is not a cause of TBTV. 0,171 1  0,680 0,011 0,593 0,552 
HAO is not the cause of TBTV 2,271 1  0,132 1,221 2,042 0,041 
KURY is not a cause of TBTV 0,679 1  0,410 0,001 0,069 0,944 
ORTAK is not the cause of TBTV 0,744 1  0,388 0,011 1,895 0,058 
YABP is not a cause of TBTV 0,364 1  0,546 -0,121 -3,019 0,003 
Independent variable: TBTV       
TBTV is not a cause of EBOP 0,124 1  0,723 -0,009 -0,784 0,433 
TBTV is not a cause of HAO 2,154 1  0,142 0,017 1,420 0,155 
TBTV is not a cause of KURY 0,004 1  0,948 0,002 0,091 0,927 
TBTV is not a cause of ORTAK 0,158 1  0,691 0,023 0,404 0,686 
TBTV is not a cause of YABP 1,832 1  0,176 0,447 1,537 0,124 
Note: H0: There is no causality relationship from independent variable to the dependent variable. 
 
In the model where the capital structure (TBTV) is a dependent variable, the 
finding that none of the independent variables belonging to the ownership structure 
has a causality relation to the TBTV was found.  In the model where the variables 
belonging to the ownership structure are dependent variables respectively, the 
finding that none of the independent variables of the capital structure (TBTV) has a 
causality relation through the ownership structure. 
H1a Rejection: EBOP variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1b Rejection: HAO variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1c Rejection: KURY variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1d Rejection: ORTAK variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1e Rejection: YABP variable is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H1 Rejection: The ownership structure is not the cause of the capital structure. 
H2a Rejection: The capital structure is not the cause of the EBOP variable. 
H2b Rejection: The HAO variable is not the cause of the HAO variable. 
H2c Rejection: The KURY variable is not the cause of the KURY variable. 
H2d Rejection: The ORTAK variable is not the cause of the ORTAK variable. 
H2e Rejection: The EBOP variable is not the cause of the YABP variable. 
H2 Rejection: The capital structure is not the cause of the ownership structure. 
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4. Conclusion 
In the BİST Industrial Index and Service Index, it has been examined whether 
there is a causality relation to the ownership structure between the model, where 
the company capital structure (TBTV) is the dependent variable, the independent 
variables belonging to the ownership structure and in the model, where the 
variables belonging to the ownership structure re dependent respectively, to the 
independent variable (TBTV)  through the ownership structure of the companies 
operating in 2006-2014 period. However, before analyzing whether there is a 
meaningful relationship between the dependent and the independent variables, it 
was examined whether there is a cointegrated condition in these variables. It was 
seen that the best values of the information criteria were obtained in the first delay 
(Table 5). In this case, after ensuring the variables to be stable by taking their first 
delays to determine the appropriate model in the cointegration analysis, the 
maximum delay length should be determined for the series before proceeding to the 
Engle Granger Cointegration analysis.  
For this purpose, the VAR (vector autoregressive) model was used to determine 
the maximum determine length to identify how many years of determine the 
interaction between the series occurred and the Akaike and Schwarz information 
criteria were practiced. The error correction models were used because of the long-
run relationship between the variables. There was a lost of long-lasting information 
during the stabilization of the series by taking the differences. The error correction 
models were applied to remove the imbalances created by these losses. In the error 
correction models, the error terms of the regression series were formed and a 
delayed version of the obtained error was added to the model. According to the 
Trace and Max-Eigen statistics, Johansen-Juselius cointegration test findings are 
presented in Table 9. 
As a result of analyzing statistics about the service index; in the model where 
the capital structure (TBTV) is a dependent variable, the finding that none of the 
independent variables belonging to the ownership structure has a causality relation 
to the TBTV was found. In the model where the variables belonging to the 
ownership structure were dependent variables, the finding that independent 
variable belonging to the capital structure (TBTV) is the reason of the change in 
the ownership structure variables EBOP (X2 = 15, 17; p<0,05), HAO (X2 = 4,71; 
p<0,005) and KURY (X2 = 5,27; p<0.05) According to the results obtained, 1 
period delay in the capital structure causes decrease in EBOP and HAO; increase in 
KURY. 
As a result of analyzing the statistics about the industrial index: Two-way 
causality has been assessed in order to investigate the reciprocal effects of the 
ownership structure and the capital structure. In the model where the variables 
belonging to the ownership structure are dependent variables respectively, the 
finding that none of the independent variables of the capital structure (TBTV) has a 
causality relation through the ownership structure. 
In the model where the variables belonging to the ownership structure are 
dependent variables respectively, the finding that none of the independent variables 
of the capital structure (TBTV) has a causality relation through the ownership 
structure was found. 
The first of the obtained finding is that the variables representing the ownership 
structure of the businesses in the service index do not have causality factor about 
the capital structure of these businesses.  However, as to the variable representing 
the capital structure is the reason of the changes in the EBOP (Share of the Biggest 
Partner), HAO (Free Float Rate) and KURY (Corporate Investor Rate) variables of 
the ownership structure. A one period delay in the capital structure of the 
businesses causes a decrease in the EBOP and HAO variables and an increase in 
the KURY variable. As to the businesses in the industrial index, a causality 
relationship was not seen between the ownership structures and the capital 
structures in the context of these variables and the two structures do not effect each 
other. 
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It is thought that the study has a genuine attribution with regard to revealing the 
bi-directional relationship between the ownership structure and the capital structure 
through the variables representing the ownership structure and the capital structure, 
having a wide scope in terms of used variables and the analysis period, 
cointegration in the methodology used, VAR granger causality test, using the 
impulse and response methods and it is also thought that it contributes to the 
related literature. The relevant study can be developed by means of further studies 
about the subject, including the comparison of the scope of the analysis with 
different indexes, the expansion in the context of the period and the sector, the use 
of different ownership and capital structure variables and the application of 
different methods. However, in order to be able to make more precise judgments, it 
is necessary to carry out studies that can analyze the long-run equilibrium and 
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